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The End of the ‘New’
as We Know It
 
Post-1990 and the ‘New’ Beginnings in
Turkish Culture
 
Hasan Bülent Kahraman
 
When defined within the context of ‘recent past’ or ‘contemporaneity’, or
the cultural problems that characterise it, Turkey’s cultural history gains
a special meaning and significance in the post-1990 era. Public debate in
this period contained the phenomenon of conflict with ‘modern history’,
which defined the period immediately preceding it. This conflict is dialec-
tic, creative and productive. The elements of debate that have come to the
fore since 1990 simultaneously influenced the political and social agendas.
The ‘cultural’ also forms the backbone of this era, indicating a major break
with modern history in the sense that in the former model the ‘political’
had always determined the cultural domain. Yet one must remain mindful
of the cultural as characteristic of Turkish modernisation. This article will
review the quality of this transformation and how it reflects on modern
Turkish cultural production in relation to its historical background.
 
THE HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE AND SOME INDICATIONS 
OF CULTURAL MODERNISATION
 
The cultural history of modern Turkey has been determined by several
turning points.
These turning points go back all the way to 1839.
 
1
 
 This date marking
the start of the 
 
Tanzimat
 
 (Reformation) Era is interchangeable with
1908, the Second Parliamentary Monarchy Era. The third major turning
point is 1923 and the proclamation of the Republic when the concept of
‘modernisation’ became fundamental in its own right, and gained irrevo-
cable acceptance. Modernisation at this point is an ideology determining
not only the hegemonic politics pursued by the founders of the new state
but also the parameter which legitimises these politics.
 
2
 
It is equally valid to explain this in the reverse: the republic and the
modernisation it contained represent the pinnacle of the metamorphosis
 
1 Cemal Kafadar is of the 
view that the beginning of 
Ottoman modernisation 
can be dated to the 
sixteenth century with 
certain provisos. That said, 
this article examines the 
systematic, Western-
oriented modernisation 
that naturally dates from 
1839. In other words, 1839 
is the start date of a certain 
concept of modernisation 
that this article will focus 
on as well as criticise when 
needed.
2 The best source to follow 
this history is Bernard 
Lewis, 
 
The Emergence of 
Modern Turkey
 
, Oxford 
University Press, second 
edition, London–Oxford–
New York, 1968.
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within the concept of reform begun in 1839. The concept of modernisa-
tion referred to here is, in essence, Westernisation. The West exemplified
modernisation in the mental cartography of the time. Ziya Gökalp in his
social project defined the Turkish people as belonging to ‘the parish of
Islam, European (Western) civilisation and the Turkish nation’.
 
3
 
 Gökalp,
who was fundamentally influenced by Emile Durkheim’s sociology, and
who himself in turn influenced the formation of Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk’s views, held the view that sociocultural criteria were 
 
collective
representations
 
, and these constituted subconscious truths. In short,
though not often emphasised, these definitions that carried traces of the
German idealism of the time led Gökalp to try to create a collective
(communal) identity, placing him on the religious-nationalistic axis.
The republic seemed destined to accept this ideal. Yet the true
personality of the republic would be in line with despotic enlighten-
ment.
 
4
 
 Its crystallisation point was secularism which foresaw the total
eradication of religion (Islam) from the public realm. This concept
informed the modernisation project of which the republic was but a
single link. The modernisation in question was to take place under the
leadership of the political and state elites which would implement the
ideal society and the necessity of a non-political environment. A demo-
cratic system or a political entity called ‘opposition’ was not part of this
equation. A system that would implement Westernisation and harmony
with the West in an autocratic manner was being formed. This policy
can be said to have succeeded within its remit.
The republican era initiated a number of its own turning points.
 
5
 
 The
momentum of social transformation created a line of tension defined as
‘centre–periphery’, as historical analysis has revealed.
 
6
 
 The year 1950
stands out as a major stage in this context. It witnessed the rise to power
of a political organisation representing the provincial claim to power
that had hitherto been in the monopoly of the statist political elite.
 
7
 
 This
political rule, destined to last for a decade, would survive on a cultural-
populist basis and would close down the major, functional but ulti-
mately ideological institutions of the early republican era such as the
People’s Houses and Village Institutes. The centre, led by the intelligen-
tsia and the bureaucracy but implemented by the armed forces, would
end this era after ten years with a military coup in order to reform soci-
ety once more in the course of Kemalist reforms. However, the die was
already cast; the new era opened the door to a brand-new cultural
phenomenon. The leftist political actions manifested throughout the
whole of Western Europe in the 1960s would rage on in Turkey until
1980 as part of the struggle for power between the centre and the
periphery.
 
8
 
 The aftermath of the last big and direct 
 
coup d’état
 
 in 1980
was the search for an entirely different Turkey.
 
9
 
The 1983 election gave rise to two things in Turkey. The constitution
produced by the 1980 coup had left behind the legacy of an apolitical,
corporatist society under guardianship which should be called a tutelage
society. The new government did nothing to disturb the military junta
but, on the contrary, appeared to accept its fundamental ideology. That
said, neoliberal and right-wing governments were emerging around the
world in the mid-1980s, as in Turkey. This rightist government was
based on a decidedly congregationist structure in politics while its
‘liberal’ wings followed a more open path.
 
10
 
 ‘Open’ in this context had
 
3 Ziya Gökalp, 
 
Türkle
 
[scedil]
 
mek, 
 
[Idot  
]
 
slamla
 
[scedil]
 
mak, 
Muasırla
 
[scedil]
 
mak
 
 
(
 
Turkification, 
Islamisation, 
Modernisation
 
), Inkılap 
Books, Istanbul, 1960. See 
also Ziya Gökalp, 
 
The 
Principals of Turkism
 
, 
trans R Devereux, E J Brill, 
Leiden, 1968.
4 See Julie Candler Hayes, 
 
Reading the French 
Enlightenment: System and 
Subversion
 
, Cambridge 
University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, pp 1–3 
for a debate on the concept 
of Despotic Enlightenment. 
See the following on 
Radical Enlightenment, 
Jonathan I Israel, 
 
Radical 
Enlightenment: Philosophy 
and the Making of 
Modernity 1650–1750
 
, 
new edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford–
New York, new edition, 
2002; key views are also 
found in the author’s 
 
Enlightenment Contested: 
Philosophy, Modernity and 
the Emancipation of Man 
1670–1752
 
, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
and New York, 2006.
5 All these factors as well as a 
different ‘categorisation’ of 
post-1908 Turkish culture 
are analysed in Hasan 
Bülent Kahraman, ‘From 
 
Progressive Conservatism
 
 
to 
 
Conservative 
Progressivity
 
 in Turkish 
Culture’, 
 
Culture and 
Society in Modern Turkey
 
: 
 
Conference Proceedings
 
, 
Moshe Dayan Center for 
Middle Eastern and African 
Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, Tel Aviv, 2007, 
pp 17–28.
6 It is professor Mardin who, 
starting from Shills, applied 
the ‘Centre-Right’ concept 
to the Turkish political 
structure. 
 
[Scedil] erif Mardin, 
‘Center–Periphery 
Relations: A Key to Turkish 
Politics’, 
 
Deadalus
 
, Winter, 
1973, pp 169–80. See 
Hasan Bülent Kahraman 
for an introduction to the 
latter-day debate on the 
concept: 
 
Türk Sa
 
[gbrev]
 
ı ve AKP 
(The Turkish Right and 
AKP)
 
, Agora Books, 
Istanbul, 2006.
¸
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two meanings. First, Turkey’s political and social structure, hitherto
determined to remain statist, insular and closed to the wider world, now
violently opened up to a new economic mentality. Second, ‘open’ deter-
mined a new focal point for Turkey regarding the implementation of
American culture in Turkey. This was not the first time it had been
Turkey’s goal, but this passionate ardour was utterly unprecedented.
America as a cultural goal for Turkey was a tremendously significant
conversion on the sociocultural stage. Cultural policy, which had previ-
ously focused on high culture, slid swiftly towards popular culture.
‘Popular culture’ here indicates something of an anthropological
phenomenon. It emphasises the weight, if not yet the dominance, of the
result of the move to the cities from the country that had begun in the
1950s. It signalled a tacit acceptance of the part this rural displacement
would play within social culture. But, despite all concessions, the
government and its ideological apparatus meant a ‘blended-eclectic’
country culture as seen in the cities, rather than actual country culture
itself. As a matter of fact, the concept of the middle class, reiterated ad
nauseum in the 1980s, meant exactly that.
 
11
 
 The middle class, for its
part, was the focal point of a sociocultural opening decidedly American
in origin.
This cultural preference, which stamped its mark on the entire 1980s,
very quickly evolved within its own boundaries. In a very short time,
popular culture that had been anthropological, yet still democratic to a
degree, conveyed to mass culture.
 
12
 
 This latest term was a direct exten-
sion of the culture industry itself. Commercial TV stations, the spread of
new technological and electronic gadgets and the animation of mass
communications, insufficiently realised until then, comprised a new
beginning. Television and the entertainment industry were the particular
backbone of this new beginning. Television had very quickly covered the
whole of Turkey and lost little time in ushering in new cultural attitudes.
As the 1990s came round, Turkey familiarised itself with the world at
large, broke free of its traditional shell and arrived at the doorstep of a
new cultural phenomenon best described as 
 
everyday life
 
 culture.
 
13
 
Postmodernist debates of the time were equally influential in the forma-
tion of this ‘new cultural phenomenon’. The end of the Cold War, marked
by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, put an end to traditional nation-state
identities and nurtured new searches in Turkey. Postmodernism also
began to question the rigidly rationalistic principles and ideals of the
Enlightenment that had for so long been a fundamental element of Repub-
lican Turkey, and this doubt contributed to a relaxation on the social stage
greatly influencing the relationship between the state and the individual.
All that aside, the simple acceptance of truth gained a new significance.
 
14
 
Established and unitarian acceptance swiftly gave way to changeable and
pluralistic ideas. This meant, in effect, the acceptance of social multicul-
turalism based on identity policies and pluralism. The great breakaways
of the 1990s began to be shaped from this point onwards.
 
THE 1990s AND TURKEY
 
It would be appropriate to begin looking at the 1990s with the 1991 elec-
tions. Those elections indicated that Turkey was in dire need of change
 
7 For a detailed analysis see 
Ça
 
[gbrev]
 
lar Keyder, 
 
State and 
Class in Turkey: A Study in 
Capitalist Development
 
, 
Verso, London, 1987.
8 That the political party 
who by its own admission 
followed the DP line was 
elected in 1965 indicated 
that the people had become 
familiar with politics and 
were unwilling to depart 
from that particular line. 
The 1971 ‘memorandum’ 
coup was a new attempt by 
the centre to regain power. 
However, this coup created 
a rift in the historic 
alliance. The armed forces 
had ignored the 
intelligentsia. As a matter 
of fact, this time it was the 
enlightened Left who had 
objected to the coup.
9 See Erik Jan Zürcher, 
 
Turkey: A Modern 
History
 
, revised edition, I B 
Tauris, London, 2004.
10 For a critical assessment of 
this recent history in 
general from different 
angles see Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin, eds, 
 
Politics in 
the Third Turkish 
Republic
 
, Westview Press, 
Boulder, CO, 1994.
11 See Hasan Bülent 
Kahraman, 
 
Postmodernite 
ile Modernite Arasında 
Türkiye: 1980 Sonrası 
Zihinsel, Toplumsal, 
Siyasal Dönü
 
[scedil] üm
 
, (
 
Turkey 
Between Postmodernism 
and Modernism: Mental, 
Social and Political 
Conversion after 1980
 
), 
second edition, Agora 
Books, Istanbul, 2007, for 
detailed analysis on this 
subject.
12 I analysed this very cultural 
development and 
transformation in Turkey 
critically in my book, Hasan 
Bülent Kahraman, 
 
Kitle 
Kültürü Kitlelerin Afyonu
 
 
(
 
Mass Culture is the Opium 
of the People
 
), Agora 
Kitaplıgı, Istanbul, 2005.
13 See D Kandiyoti and A 
Saktanber, eds, 
 
Fragments 
of Culture: The Everyday of 
Modern Turkey
 
, I B Tauris, 
London, New York, 2002, 
for a general view of this 
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on two counts. The first of these was a reaction to the heavy-handed and
repressive statist constitution that had been forced on Turkey after 1980.
This anti-statist faction was led by the social democratic left. The second
was political Islam, which had managed to obtain a presence in parliament
but whose grassroots support went much deeper. These two disparate
elements converged on the desire for a new political and cultural structure.
The collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated that Turkey was itself
destined to encounter a new picture manifested by disintegration, exodus
and migration, all facets that had already been felt in stages during the
postmodern era. The metropolitan area had become a space where differ-
ent cultures of both local and alien origin intermingled and subculture
groups made their presence felt as a tangible entity.
 
15
 
 Consequently, 
 
space
 
,
 
memory
 
, 
 
identity
 
, 
 
belonging
 
, 
 
acceptance
 
 and 
 
difference politics
 
 all
appeared as truths in their own right.
 
16
 
The main elements defining the post-1990 era are identity politics
that became the focal points of fundamental debates. This empowered
political Islam in the elements brought to the debate and the political
and cultural environment it created. Political Islam gained an intensity
that I call ‘contemporary progressiveness’ in Turkey with the strides it
made in the 1990s. The concept of contemporary progressiveness not
only transforms traditional historical understanding but also offers
significant opportunities. Political Islam had constantly been excluded
from the public space by the republican elite, yet political Islam and
secularism, its counterpart, played important parts as the 
 
constitutive
outside
 
.
 
17
 
 The republican-statist elite had never hesitated to brand the
Islamic section as ‘reactionary’ in political ethos. Yet it was political
Islam that in the 1990s would open the debate on the convex concepts of
the republic, bringing new dimensions to the debate regarding the head-
scarf in the context of civil/private space versus the public space. It was
democracy itself that appeared on the agenda.
 
18
 
The second wave of globalisation, beginning in the mid-1990s,
determined the need for a 
 
new democracy
 
 as a universal demand and
desire. Turkey participated in this debate to a limited extent. The enun-
ciation of such requirements as civil rights, private space and the defini-
tion of a new social contract by the advocates of political Islam and a
group of intellectuals was a key indicator of this change in Turkey.
 
19
 
 In
the same way, starting by the mid-1990s political Islam began to gain
power, first in local government and later in parliament, and this
created an entirely new situation. In the period immediately following,
the army intervened once more in 1997, but this time with a completely
different method. That said, within the next five years, Turkey’s ‘iron
rule’ exhibited itself once more and resulted in a landslide for the party
whose roots lay in political Islam (AKP), although it was founded as a
reaction to it.
 
20
 
 This triumph was repeated in the recent 2007 elections
and apparently the AKP is now considered the most significant liberal-
Islamic-reformative political force in Turkey. This itself is a powerful
signifier of the transformation that Turkey has undergone in the last
fifteen years. What is equally challenging is that despite the AKP declar-
ing itself conservative democrat, the needs and expectations concerning
transformation-
 
cum
 
-reform are addressed to this party. This speaks of
the problematic linkage between conservatism and the ambition for
progressive politics.
 
21
subject and Martin Stokes, 
‘Afterword: Recognising 
the Everyday’, in 
 
Fragments
 
, op cit, pp 322–
38, for a particular study.
14 Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 
‘The conversion of reality 
in the post-modern era, 
media and popular 
culture’, 
 
Postmodernite
 
, op 
cit, pp 146–72.
15 For example, Istanbul was 
at that time witness to just 
such a development on a 
district level. Some districts 
were beginning to host new 
‘guests’ arriving from 
Russia; a ‘Polish Market’ 
was organised in the centre 
of the city; a serious human 
trafficking issue over 
Russia was on the agenda; 
districts such as Cihangir, 
while being gentrified on 
the one hand, were also 
increasingly the homes of 
homosexuals, transvestites 
and transsexuals and 
finally a group of Africans.
16 It is worth pointing out 
here that in the post-1990 
era there has been an 
overwhelming inclination 
in Turkish universities 
toward the foundation of 
Cultural Studies 
departments focusing 
mostly on similar subjects.
17 This term belongs to 
Jacques Derrida and has 
been applied to Turkish 
politics by Bobby Said in  
 
The Fundamental Fear: 
Eurocentrism and the 
Emergence of Islamism
 
, 
Zed Books, London, 1997.
18 There is now a large and 
rapidly growing literature 
on the birth and 
development of political 
Islam in Turkey. See, Jenny 
White, 
 
Islamist 
Mobilization in Turkey: A 
Study in Vernacular 
Politics
 
, University of 
Washington Press, Seattle, 
WA, 2002.
19 The endeavour of Islamic 
intellectuals in Turkey is 
studied in an old but 
productive text, Michael 
Meeker, ‘The New Muslim 
Intellectuals in the 
Republic of Turkey’, in 
Richard Tapper, ed, 
 
Islam 
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Turkey is set to turn a new page in its history. This is demonstrated by
the person soon to become Prime Minister, R T Erdo
 
[gbrev]
 
an, whose charac-
teristics are very different from those of previous incumbents. This new
Prime Minister of the ‘New Turkey’ originates from the religious sector
that was in constant conflict with previous ministerial governance and the
republic. He comes from Kasımpa
 
[scedil] a, on the outskirts of Istanbul, was
educated at an Imam-Hatip school (the official school for Imams and
Preachers) and speaks no foreign languages. He has no work or education
experience of the world outside Turkey and has not worked for a single
day in the public sector. He has no managerial experience other than a spell
as Mayor of Istanbul. His previous political career was forged in political
Islam.
 
22
 
I ought at this point to introduce the concepts of 
 
civil society
 
 and 
 
civil
consciousness
 
 that gained ascendancy in the mid-1990s, although they
were in place some ten years earlier. In the mid-1980s there was a revival
of the concept of civil society in parallel with developments in the former
Eastern Bloc and the New Social Movements. The consciousness that
arose in Turkey of both civil society and liberal understanding was
strongly supported by Turgut Özal, as Prime Minister first and later as
President. The formation of civil society in Turkey did not follow a
traditional path. It eventually came to mean the rise of society-focused
claims in opposition to the state. In the highly chaotic and politically
anguished environment post-1980, it also assisted in the search for an
oppositional stance to the state, with human rights at the forefront.
These developments gained momentum under the influence of globalisa-
tion and the widening interest in the democratic world. Again, political
Islam and the women’s movement are examples of civil society initiatives
in their own right. The empowerment of the bourgeoisie and its desire to
play a part in political and social life independent of the state also bear
special weight in this context. ‘The New Culture’ of contemporary
Turkey was born as a common movement of all these elements which we
may now look at in more detail.
 
SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF THE NEW CULTURE
 
1 The role of the ‘truth’
 
The systematic development here is from a state-centred perception to one
where society takes precedence. Its most striking outcome is pluralistic
perception on the cultural stage which brings the ‘ownership’ of democracy
through a new awareness. Of primary note here is the change in the percep-
tion of the concept of 
 
truth
 
 and the conflicts that this change brought
about. From a cultural standpoint, this conflict may be said to have started
at the time when identity policies entered the agenda. Previously, a nation-
alistic and unitarian historical view had allowed minority identities to
remain forgotten in exclusion from society and history. This was a certain
perception of truth. Beginning in the 1990s, and with increasing momen-
tum in the 2000s, first the Kurdish identity and next the highly charged
and controversial Armenian identity burst into the public domain with all
their historical and current baggage. Kurdish identity and the Armenian
issue in the final stages of the Ottoman Empire cried out for attention.
˘
¸
 
in Modern Turkey: 
Religion, Literature and 
Politics in a Secular State
 
, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 1994, pp 189–
219.
20 See Hasan Bülent 
Kahraman, 
 
Türk Sa
 
[gbrev] ı ve 
AKP
 
 for a detailed analysis 
of this history; various 
different approaches might 
be found in M Hakan 
Yavuz, ed, 
 
The Emergence 
of a New Turkey
 
, 
University of Utah Press, 
Salt Lake City, 2006.
21 The opening of the concept 
of ‘conservative democratic’ 
is found in Yalçın Akdo
 
[gbrev] an, 
‘The Meaning of 
Conservative Democratic 
Political Identity’, in 
 
Emergence
 
, ed M Hakan 
Yavuz, op cit, pp 49–65.
22 There is not yet an 
analytical biography of 
Erdo
 
[gbrev]
 
an but as a useful 
source see, Ru
 
[scedil] en Çakır, 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdo
 
[gbrev]
 
an: Bir 
Dönü
 
[scedil] üm Öyküsü
 
 (
 
Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan:A 
Transformation Story
 
), 
Metis, Istanbul, 2001.
˘
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2 The process of de-centralisation
 
The cultural atmosphere of the 1990s therefore bears witness to the
anguish of a transformation from a Durkheimian 
 
organic society
 
 to a
post-Weberian 
 
decentralised society
 
. The cultural dynamics that increas-
ingly resulted from the lower middle class gaining a greater role,
combined with political Islam, are explained within this framework.
 
23
 
The endeavour for the creation of a decentralised society was also due
partly to a transformation of the East–West dichotomy.
Two major elements played their parts in creating this result at the
time. First, republican cultural and social values had succumbed to the
impact of sociocultural movements and a populist will. Second, a
cultural morphology of Western origin and Judeo-Christian in essence
had also lost its dominance in the West as a singular cultural focal point
of truth. At the same time, the highly controversial ‘clash of civilisations’
thesis of the 2000s provoked societies outside the West to review them-
selves in an entirely new light. This concept, so widely referred to in
Turkey, has influenced the change in how a society largely composed of
Muslims began to view the West.
The 2000s therefore offered a new language in which to debate the
East versus West issue, one of the most potent concepts since the preceding
reforms in Turkey and which legitimised Westernists and the Easternists
equally. The common place of this language is the European Union.
Turkey’s unrequited wish for full accession to the European Union trans-
formed Europe itself into an increasingly questioned culture and entity.
The once warm relationship that a conservative government had nurtured
with Europe quickly soured and had serious consequences in Turkey’s
sociocultural arena. The leading outcome has been the rise of nationalism.
A segment of society, unable to digest the post-nation-state parameters,
boosted nationalism in a period when similar behaviour could be observed
in the USA and in Europe. Therefore, while the meaning of conservatism
and progressivism changed, so also did nationalism as the common
denominator underlying all ideologies. As a result, Turkey rapidly began
to slide towards the right and to use rightist cultural references in the
period after 1990.
 
3 Non-Western modernity as a common denominator
 
It is an absolute certainty that this phenomenon, by no means rare in
history, is offered as a solution. It is pertinent to the upheavals of post-
1990 Turkey that concepts once seen as dual contrasts, and which
provided the linchpin for Turkish modernisation, have now become dual
syntheses. Phenomena once viewed as three major points of conflict, ie,
‘secularism–Islamism’, ‘Western–Eastern’ or ‘urban–provincial’, in time
became accepted as concepts that could coexist, that occasionally
conflicted and yet were capable of creating a common and unique fabric.
This situation was directly perceived as a position of non-Western
modernity despite all the rifts in post-1990 Turkey.
Turkey’s re-evaluation of its relationship with modernity created its
own problems. In the 1990s, for the first time ever, it became possible to
visualise modernity as a non-centrist phenomenon within a climate of
 
23 A number of different 
aspects of Turkish 
modernity seen from a 
viewpoint based more on 
sociology and social theory 
are discussed in 
 
[Scedil] erif 
Mardin, 
 
Religion, Society 
and Modernity in Turkey
 
, 
Syracuse University Press, 
Syracuse, NY, 2006.
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intense pressure and debate that globalisation had introduced. The lower
middle classes and the countryside played critical roles here. Rural life-
style, sets of values, preferences and cultural codes not only burst into
the metropolitan arena but also stood to take over the values hitherto
dominant in that urban environment.
 
24
 
 That debates about the headscarf
issue turned into a barometer of modernisation shows just how sociocul-
tural organisations in today’s Turkey have moved beyond the domain of
conventional modernity.
Another key indicator in this direction is the way in which liberal-
ism also moved beyond the boundaries of political choice in the 1990s.
Liberalism had been an unfamiliar political formation in Turkey. But
that said, a political party of the 1990s (YDH), firmly entrenched in
the urban centre, and one that indisputably represented the upper
income groups of the bourgeoisie in consort with a series of intellectu-
als, aimed to defend and popularise liberalism in its widest sense. This
drive was confronted with robust criticism from the established politi-
cal structure. The end result was that the party dissolved itself after the
first election in which it ran. A newspaper, 
 
Yeni Yüzyıl
 
 (
 
New Century
 
),
entered the arena at the same time as the YDH and defended the same
stance – which indicates the importance a certain factional group
placed on this subject. While this debate continued, a similar one raged
through the political party, SHP, that was the founder of traditional
modernisation in Turkey.
 
25
 
 At the outset of the 1990s, the most impor-
tant issue within the SHP was the formation of a ‘liberal Leftist’ party
instead of a statist legacy supporter ‘Leftist’ party that had prescribed
top-down modernisation. This concept of ‘liberal Left’ had yet to be
uttered. The review of some of the concepts underlying the CHP’s
ideology as represented in its Six Arrows, and the transformation and
renovation of their contents, were the main goals of a group that called
itself the ‘New Left’.
This debate was won by the traditionalists and not the reformists.
The reformists, for their part, seceded. Surprisingly, they later returned
and restarted the CHP, increasingly backsliding despite the changing
conditions and coming to defend values they had once opposed. This is
the point at which established reformism in Turkey rapidly slid into
contemporary reformism. But this situation was not limited to the
CHP. Another group of intellectuals emerged, again in the 1990s,
focused on traditional modernisation and aiming to reinterpret the
historical context of Kemalism which was its concrete ideology. This
group styled itself the Second Republicans. The goal here was the reno-
vation of Kemalism and the hegemonic modernisation concept that had
moved from the centre to the periphery and was inextricably linked to
Kemalism.
This movement was set to link up with the YDH but the expected
expansion never happened. Liberalisation continued as an intense yet
ineffective drive in the 1990s and reappeared in the 2000s. Another
quest, again originating from the Left, led to a second attempt by the
‘liberal Left’ to form an alliance of intellectuals and bureaucrats just
before the 2002 elections. This attempt also failed in the face of violent
opposition from the conventional section. It was at that moment that the
concept of 
 
non-Western modernisation
 
 was propagated by the Islamic
Right instead of the Left.
 
24 Gül Özyegin, ‘The 
Doorkeeper, the Maid and 
the Tenant: Troubling 
Encounters in the Turkish 
Urban Landscape’, in 
Kandiyoti and Saktanber, 
eds, 
 
Fragments
 
, op cit, 
pp 43–72.
25 This was CHP, the 
Republican People’s Party. 
Sadly, it had been 
abolished by the generals 
following the 1980 coup 
along with all the other 
political parties and had 
yet to be reinstated during 
the period in question. The 
Popular Social Democrat 
Party (SHP) founded after 
1980 was a true follower 
of the CHP.
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THE FOUNDING ELEMENTS OF THE NEW CULTURE
1 The intellectuals and their new position
This framework so far outlines the fundamental conflicts between the
cultural structures pre- and post-1990. The major differences between
the two periods hinge on conservatism–reformism, secularism–faith,
centre–surroundings and state–society. Another key element here is the
role played by intellectuals. Previously staunch defenders as well as
propagators of the hegemonic ideology of the centre, intellectuals began
to evolve an entirely different identity in this period. They are now the
defenders of a much more liberal ideology. They may well have lost
some of the powerful social standing once previously enjoyed but still
play a determining role in fundamental topics of debate. More impor-
tant, they have moved away from the traditional alliances. Intellectuals
defending a liberal stance broke off all ties especially with the army and
the bureaucracy and have even taken a position in complete opposition
to them.
Nevertheless, it is still quite difficult to view Turkish intellectuals,
who faced their own share of trouble in the past, as ‘special intellectuals’
in the sense defined by Michel Foucault. Intellectuals fulfilled all the
responsibilities associated with being in the general sense ‘engaged’,
following in the footsteps of their forefathers since the time of the
Reformation. This position was particularly evident in the defence of EU
relations. Intellectuals did not merely defend EU integration as an inevi-
table outcome of their own traditional Westernist roots but more as a
tool with which to oppose the state.
Three events marked the entry into the 2000s and constituted
another factor that defined the changing role of the state in the 1990s.
The first is the incident known as the Susurluk Scandal. That event
brought to an end the phenomenon called raison d’état which had up to
that point been one of the main linchpins of the state and statist groups
in Turkey. It was assumed that the ‘deep state’ syndrome had been
uncovered after that incident, which shed light on the corruption within
the state. Large swathes of society lost their traditional trust in the state.
The second event was the 1999 earthquake. The state was found want-
ing in the face of this disaster and the people felt no hesitation in
expressing their anger. The third incident was the high-speed train disas-
ter. This calamity was a direct result of the state’s desire to impress
rather than create a solidly efficient structure. It convinced the majority
of people that populist policies had reached the end of the road. While
the 2002 elections are viewed as a direct extension of this perception,
many intellectuals also pointed out that the people had begun to believe
that reactions do not elicit results and this view caused a great deal of
frustration.
The period following 1990 can be said to have created an important
cultural plateau whose outcomes have not yet entirely matured in
Turkey. This refers to the rapid loss of meaning in the concept of demo-
cratic culture as a cultural position. Defended hotly during the 1970s
and 1980s, this was the view that claimed the state had to relinquish its
culturally defining role whose methodology has been rooted in the post-
1923 statism. The world of culture ought instead to be handed over to
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the leadership of a number of professional associations that were already
active in their own fields. In this new set-up, the state would act only as
a coordinator and provide funding; an entirely democratic National
Council for Culture and Arts would handle regulations. Thus the state
would finally relinquish the hegemonic function that it had exercised
throughout the nineteenth century. Culture and the arts would no longer
be used in Turkey, as a tool to ‘forge good citizens’, in Matthew
Arnold’s sense, was the aim in the Republican Era.26
This formerly relevant demand disappeared entirely after 1995.
Another debate filled the vacuum. The rising nationalist wave and the
constant stream of rightist governments in Turkey opened the way for
more conservative and local quests in the cultural sector. Nonetheless,
this new wave did not manage to preserve the cultural legacy of the past
with much transparency, despite all its protestations of conservatism.
The Ottoman cultural legacy still languishes unloved, undervalued and
much omitted to this day. The state in fact has completely disappeared
from the cultural stage, and has become even less visible than had been
demanded by the most ‘minimalist state interference’ views that held
sway in the earlier independence debates.27 This is clearly evidenced by
the transformation of the Ministry of Culture into the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism which took place under the auspices of a conserva-
tive government. A damaging polarised formation gained ascendancy
over this environment after 2002. The conservative government in
power faced strong distrust and violent criticism by cultural production
centres. The proposed redevelopment of Taksim Square, for example,
was taken to indicate that a mosque would be erected in the middle of
the square; and again, the proposal to demolish the Atatürk Culture
Centre, also in Taksim Square, to be replaced by a newer one, fuelled an
outcry that the government was preventing cultural activity by sheer
ideological intervention. A substantial culture under such conditions
becomes almost impossible.
Despite all that, post-1990s Turkey witnessed three highly significant
advances, whose examination will allow us to conclude this article.
2 The reality of TV and the middle classes
A true understanding of the new cultural formations that arose in post-
1990s Turkey is only possible through an appreciation of the TV channels
and the middle classes that they widely targeted. The entertainment
industry gained a mass dimension in Turkey in the 1990s. The notion of
entertainment, hitherto largely ‘modest’ in nature, changed very quickly
after these years. Mass culture and the entertainment industry originated
in the 1950s when the urban bourgeoisie largely dominated cultural and
social behaviour patterns. This fact was clearly manifested by the codes
of the cultural world. Müzeyyen Senar and Zeki Müren, the first to attain
star status on stage, marking in effect the beginning of the entertainment
industry in Turkey, took special pains to constrain their behaviour and
comply with the established modes of morality and ‘social respect’,
despite their own clearly incongruous natures. Zeki Müren, who exuded
a drag-queen persona and whose transvestite appearance was ground-
breaking at the time, still paid scrupulous attention to the requirements
26 David Lloyd and Paul 
Thomas, Culture and the 
State, Routledge, London–
New York, 1998, p 1
27 The state–Kemalism link 
and relation with its 
looming presence in the 
public memory is studied 
by Esra Özyürek, 
Nostalgia for the Modern: 
State Secularism and 
Everyday Politics in 
Turkey, Duke University 
Press, Durham,
NC–London, 2006.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
TÜ
BT
AK
 E
KU
AL
] 
At
: 
13
:5
7 
15
 O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
8
30
of bourgeois morality and manners and even insisted on being addressed
as ‘pa[scedil] a’, the traditional military term used for generals. In contrast, these
boundaries were summarily done away with in the 1990s despite the
Radio TV High Council that came to prominence then.
Turkish TV channels did not confine themselves to replacing the
stage, by that time in its death-throes, but went way beyond to show the
world ‘backstage’. ‘Backstage’ was no longer concerned only with popu-
lar singers and stars of the stage. In an environment that became entirely
‘tabloid’ in approach, the unseen facets of everyone’s life became the
subject matter of TV programmes and major newspapers. The paparazzi
became a major branch of the media in this period. Disclosure of private
lives with no concern for boundaries, news broadcasts divested of tradi-
tional sobriety, and magazine items concentrating on the disclosure of
private ‘secrets’, as has been criticised by Pierre Bourdieu, became fash-
ionable. The proliferation of commercial TV channels served only to
inflame this situation. Page three in major newspapers became entirely
devoted to sensational news of murders and accidents.28 All newspapers,
without exception, raced to publish pictures of scantily clad women on
their back pages. This was an important step in the ascent of mass
enchantment and social pornography.29
The second dimension in the TV middle class duo is formed by the
TV shows targeted at the middle-class lifestyle, the number of which
increased exponentially and took over the entire medium. The middle
class can now watch themselves on these new shows: ‘Big Brother’ or
‘I Want to Get Married’ are just two of the shows that relentlessly
display a calculating mentality and social-climbing aspirations in a no-
holds-barred manner despite all protestations to the effect that Turkish
people are essentially conservative deep down. The attitudes that may
well have been utterly alien to the middle class at the start were rapidly
assimilated thanks to these programmes. TV channels in the 1990s
provided a platform on which political and social problems were widely
discussed, for example on programmes such as ‘The Political Arena’
(Siyaset Meydani). Sociopolitical topics that had recently arrived on the
agenda, such as those examined in this article, were debated on shows
that ran all night and nurtured a new public awareness. The formation
of civil society and the creation of a new political awareness were among
the positive outcomes of these programmes. What is interesting is that
the sensational ‘magazine shows’ came hard on the heels of the demise of
these political discussion programmes. This phase signals the end of the
political in Turkey.
The third leg of the TV-related activity area is formed by (soap
opera) series. Based mostly on south-eastern Turkey’s feudal lifestyle,
these serials elaborate on the desire for wealth and the mafia under-
world. This is currently the only stage on which TV channels compete
with one another. These serials and soap operas, which run for months
on end, occasionally reflect current events and have some comical rela-
tionship to a world beyond reality. The natural extension of this world
that creates its own sociology is once again magazine journalism.
Remaining airtime on TV channels is taken up by programmes at best
defined as ‘direct magazine’ shows. The soaps develop sociologically on
both horizontal and vertical axes. On the horizontal, a middle-class life-
style is portrayed, while films, especially those focusing on mafia stories,
¸
28 It is interesting that one of 
the significant members of 
the New Turkish Cinema, 
director Zeki Kubuz, made 
a film bearing this very 
name, Third Page.
29 For a detailed analysis see 
my Görsellik, Cinsellik, 
Pornografi (Visuality, 
Sexuality and 
Pornography), Agora 
Kitaplıgı, Istanbul, 2005.
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promote dumbing-down, advocate greed and encourage lawlessness in a
manner that may be qualified as ‘inciting petty bourgeois radicalism’, to
borrow a Marxist term.
Comic books are closely linked to the above. This field rose to stellar
heights in the 1980s but visibly declined in the 1990s. Nonetheless, a
dichotomy can be said to exist in cartoon magazines. On one side, the
middle-class lifestyle is unequivocally criticised. This segment is the only
medium to do so. Sadly, the same visual medium also focuses on cheap
and vulgar sexuality, especially depicting violent abuse of women.30 In
actual fact, the criticism and those criticised run side by side in this genre
ruled by the very young who originate from the outskirts of cities and
who therefore are in a position to know the subculture in depth. It has
spawned a slang which requires specialist dictionaries.31 The coalition of
the lower middle class and the plebs that began in the mid-1990s can
now be viewed as leading the cultural tournament in Turkey.
CULTURAL PRODUCTION AREAS AND INNOVATION
1 Cinema
Cinema constitutes the leading cultural formation emerging in post-
1990s Turkey. This so-called New Turkish Cinema once more empha-
sises the dominance of the rural as a vital factor.32 Virtually every director
has selected the countryside as a source and focal point, whether or not
his own roots lay in the provinces. This particular rural genre began with
Ömer Kavur in the mid-1980s and has shaped a great number of contro-
versial films. In essence, all these films reflect an intellectual approach to
cinema, also referred to as Third Cinema, concerning identity politics.
The existential crises and masculinity of the protagonists plays a specific
role in this cinema.33 They also subtly position the provinces against the
large metropolitan areas. In contrast to the cinema of the 1970s, the New
Cinema, while concentrating on the issues of space, identity and exami-
nations of memory, is also at pains to stay clear of politics. The diversity
of films in this stream allows for more popular and populist themes. At
opposite ends of the scale are Zeki Demirkubuz’s films – existentialist,
literary and in some cases cinematographically weak – and those of Nuri
Bilge Ceylan which emphasise cinematic visuality, are sensitive to changes
in time and symbolise a more complex world of meanings, as seen for
instance in Uzak (Distant), which is reminiscent of Tarkovsky and others.
In a similar vein of contrasting positions, Sinan Çetin broaches political
themes from an ironic standpoint, and Yavuz Turgul resorts to traditional
comedy techniques in his creation of lengthy epics.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of New Turkish Cinema is
how each film aims to dissociate itself from those preceding it. No
certain continuity reigns in this cinema, a situation that may be attrib-
uted to the sociological realities of the film-makers themselves. This
cinema inherited the melodrama of previous Turkish cinema and,
however different each film may set out to be, it has tended to preserve
this characteristic.34 The future of cinema is linked to the same question
facing Turkey’s cultural future: Is the next stage the forgetting of resis-
tance, or is it resistance to forgetting?
30 See Ay[scedil] e Öncü, ‘Global 
Consumerism, Sexuality as 
Public Spectacle, and the 
Cultural Remapping of 
Istanbul in the 1990s’, in D 
Kandiyoti and A 
Saktanber, Fragments of 
Culture, op cit, pp 171–91, 
especially pp 178, 178–82 
for a much more detailed 
evaluation of this topic.
31 Levent Tülek, Lumpen 
Sözlü[gbrev] ü (Chavs’ 
Dictionary), Sel Yayınevi, 
Istanbul, 2007. The 
following is also a useful 
reference in demonstrating 
the widespread use of 
specific language in the 
1990s: Filiz Bingölçe, 
Kadın Argosu Sözlü[gbrev] ü 
(Dictionary of Women’s 
Slang), Metis Yayınları, 
Istanbul, 2001.
32 See Seçil Büker, Hayalet Ev 
(Ghost House), Metis, 
Istanbul, 2006, for a 
specific evaluation of this 
cinema.
33 Melis Umut, 
‘Representations of 
Masculinities in post-1960 
Turkish Cinema’, 
unpublished MA thesis, 
Sabancı University, 
Istanbul, 2007
34 See Behice Pehlivan 
‘Melodramatic Turkish 
Cinema and its Effect on 
the New Turkish Cinema’, 
unpublished MA thesis, 
Sabancı University, 
Istanbul, 2007, for an 
excellent debate on both 
the influence of melodrama 
and the subject of 
continuity/discontinuity in 
Turkish cinema.
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2 Literature
The second most important cultural area is literature, which has
traditionally been the major cultural focal point in Turkey. The influ-
ence of literature on a society that only lately learned to express itself
in writing, that is, in the nineteenth century, and that relied on the
ideas of the newspaper litterateurs to shape its development is never-
theless undeniable. Yet even this fact has not prevented literature
being put on the back burner. Literature is today sharply hemmed in
– just as it is in the West – between bestsellers and a dwindling
number of high-quality works. But we should also emphasise that
Turkey recently ranked among the top countries for sheer output of
published novels. There are some 350 new ones a year, second only
after France.
A new school of novel writing emerged in the mid-1980s with the
Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk’s Kara Kitap (The Black Book). It
utilises confession and subconscious elements highly effectively on a
cultural platform that does not foreground any institution of formal
confession.35 That said, confession soon deteriorates into mere disclo-
sure, itself indicative of the conflict between higher and popular litera-
ture conveying a certain understanding of postmodernism. The
resources of postmodern literature were quickly adopted post-1990,
again following The Black Book. Turkish novels made use of metanar-
rative, the most important functional tool of postmodern literature, not
only in the formation of new structures but also in the reformation of
older texts. Orhan Pamuk is a representative of this technique and
Selim leri, another prominent name of ‘high literature’, used this tech-
nique by referring to the texts of an earlier generation and constantly
updating himself. Both authors focus closely on the area of memory
and their efforts have carried new literature beyond the Bergson–Proust
line of remembrance. This is closely linked to post-1990 culture poli-
tics, as the question of memory enters as a factor in the formation of
the future.
In a country where a new novel is published almost every day of the
year, there is still a lack of reliable data to explain this flurry of activity
as arising from something other than improvements in publishing tech-
nology and developments in the book industry. Reading these novels
might lead one to conclude that their escalation controversially heralds
the death of the novel itself. Novels might be considered as a tool
utilised by different sections of the new middle class. The more urban
and better educated section of higher earners use novels either as escap-
ism or as a reaction to the rise of mass popular culture, images created
by soaps, a general dumbing-down, corruption and instant consumer
gratification. On the other hand, the generation of authors of more
modest means who have just entered the ‘contest’, who are closer to the
countryside and more closely linked to popular culture employ novels as
a means of self-expression. In both cases, the novel takes on the func-
tion of witness. It is interesting that neither the authors nor the review-
ers focus on language or style in these books, almost as though they
were an ‘extra-linguistic’ language and merited no discussion, which,
again, ought to be counted as an indicator of their concrete and func-
tional qualities.
I˙
35 Orhan Pamuk, The Black 
Book, trans G Gün, 
Vintage, New York, 1994. 
For critical readings of 
Orhan Pamuk’s work see 
Sabancı Univesritesi Orhan 
Pamuk Sempozyumu 
Tutanakları (Sabancı 
University Orhan Pamuk 
Semposium Proceedings), 
Agora Kitaplı[gbrev] ı, Istanbul, 
2007.
36 Sibel Irzik, ‘Allegorical 
Lives: The public and the 
private in the modern 
Turkish novel’, in 
Relocating the Fault Lines: 
Turkey beyond the East-
West divide, Duke 
University Press, Durham, 
NC–London, 2003, 
pp 551–66.
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3 Visual arts
Visual arts are a third area of production of a specific performance in the
post-1990 era. This field came into its own in the mid-1980s. At that
time it was supported by market conditions and the rise of new galleries
and collectors. During the same period, a new generation of painters
emerged in parallel with the emergence of a new generation of critics,
and this continued into the 1990s. The visual or ‘plastic’ arts remained
largely confined to conventional techniques and preferences determined
by painterly painting until the 1990s. Thereafter the situation changed
rapidly. The role of painting declined, while new alternatives the stage,
and performance art and installations gained such ascendancy that the
term ‘visual arts’ became necessary. This can be seen as a natural
progression forced in actual fact by objective conditions. The two-
dimensional surface of the canvas and its capacity for expression failed
to convey the factors prevalent in the 1990s. Artists found themselves in
need of richer means of expression in a world where space disappeared,
where spacelessness emerged, where transgression, fragmentation and
nomadism ruled.
‘The Exhibition of Contemporary Artists’ of the 1980s is the source
of all the innovations in this field. Other exhibitions that followed, such
as ‘A Cross-section of Contemporary Art’, helped to expand and dissem-
inate galleries as an important tool of expression, an opportunity first
manifested by installations. The most significant development to follow
was the Istanbul Biennial, which transformed Istanbul into an interna-
tional city with the potential this offers for artists resident in Turkey to
confront international issues and organisations. The body subsequently
became the focal point for conceptual space, memory, belonging and
identity. An interest in body politics meant placing the body at the very
centre of art and led to the rise of performance as an activity that was
taken up by a new generation of artists from the 1990s on.
Visual arts in the 2000s have not only expanded their portfolio with
new digital and video-production techniques but have also witnessed the
rising influence of curators. Curators came on the scene with the first
Istanbul Biennials in the 1980s, and in the 2000s their dominance seems
established. The most important single aspect of this institution that
nearly obliterated personal art production is its capacity to carry interna-
tional concepts and trends to Turkey very swiftly. In the same way, the
export of Turkish art is equally promptly executed via this channel. This
is a hugely important solution that reduces the tension between the
global and the local. It should be pointed out that the visual arts swiftly
moved away from the modern and embraced the contemporary/current,
which also facilitated the deconstruction of established mentalities.
CONCLUSION
Turkey has undergone a profoundly significant social transformation in
recent history, and one interlinked with culture. The real milestone in
this history of modernisation, and the societal change of the post-1990
era in particular, in parallel with other global developments, was of a
cultural nature in essence. The cultural change in question contains its
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own peculiar characteristics. The cultural understanding that reigned
over the nineteenth and a large period of the twentieth century was one
based on the acceptance of previously determined cultural codes regu-
lated by the state.
In contrast, the regulatory relationship relaxed over this post-1990
time period, and a cultural formation based on social precedence began
to exert its influence on the state. However, since the formation of
Turkish society possesses its own specific characteristics, this reality
impacted on the cultural area, and thus arose a bottom-up cultural
model capable of impinging on the political structure, in complete
contrast to the principles of traditional Turkish modernisation. First and
foremost, this has meant the emergence of a new Turkey. While it may
appear to oppose conventional modernisation principles, this structure is
nevertheless still an outcome of Turkish modernisation. But this in no
way indicates that modernisation is complete. On the contrary, moder-
nity has a much longer journey to undertake in Turkey, and in much
more realistic conditions.
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